

**SECRET**

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR FOR

MANAGEMENT AND PLANS (DP)

18 MAR 1975

MEMO FOR: Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson  
Deputy to the Director, Central Intelligence  
for the Intelligence Community  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear General Wilson:

Reference your letter of 3 February to General Graham and Admiral Harvey's subsequent telephone call to you on 18 February.

We are actively investigating the problem of "Intelligence Support for Service School Instruction on Soviet Tactical Doctrine" and will provide you with the results of our study as soon as they are available.

Meanwhile, you may be interested in some recent correspondence between General Aaron and General Graham (Enclosures 1 and 2) relating to this general subject.

Sincerely,



CLIFFORD R. UPPER

2 Enclosures

1. DAMI-FIR, 11 Nov 74 (S) Director for Management
2. S-2314/DP-2A, 20 Feb 75 and Plans (S)

UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES  
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ARMY and DIA review(s) completed.

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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

DAMI-FIR

11 NOV 1974


SUBJECT: Intelligence Production Requirements

Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20301

1. Army service schools, commanders and planners require complete, detailed and up-to-date information on the armed forces of the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China. A number of publications on the Soviet Union are obsolete; Motorized Rifle Division AP-220-309-68-INT - 1968, Motorized Rifle Regiment AP-1-220-3-6-66 INT - 1966 and Soviet Tank Company AP-220-3-10-67-INT - 1967. As a result, it is extremely difficult to provide an accurate picture of the potential enemy and conduct realistic training.
2. Inclosed are seven IPR's which are significant requirements and should be validated for production. Six of these IPR's have been previously submitted but production was denied. In view of the Army's continuing need and receipt of additional requests, I feel the Defense Intelligence Agency should reexamine its position.
3. I would like to stress the need for detailed information at the lowest tactical level in future studies. The lack of this type information has been a serious deficiency of previous studies on Soviet military forces. Studies should also be kept at the lowest possible classification level. This further enhances their usefulness for training purposes.

7 Incl

1. 75-24
2. 75-43
3. 75-44
4. 75-45
5. 75-46
6. 75-47
7. 75-48

  
HAROLD R. AARON  
Major General, GS  
ACofS for Intelligence

CF: TRADOC